Stoltenberg government was warned about spy threat – TV 2

The notes to the KGB’s former chief archivist Vasily Mitrokhin has been a gold mine for intelligence agencies in many countries.

After his defection to Britain formed notes basis that British Secret Intelligence Service, also known as MI6, share over 3500 spy reports by 36 countries secret services.

In Denmark, a public investigation showed that the material contains essential information about Danish conditions. PET received 79 debriefingsrapporter about 51 Danish citizens, according to a 2009 report.

What told Mitrokhin about Norway?

In 1999 claimed VG that Mitrokhin gave POT information about KGB spies who have operated in Norway. In 2001 wrote VG about a book project that contained “revealing information” about Norwegian politicians’ relationship with the KGB in the 70s and 80s. Police Inspector Stein Vale said that POT was aware that Professor Christopher Andrew kept a book in which Norway is the topic.

smuggled out NOTES: When the KGB archivist Vasily Mitrokhin defected to Britain in 1992, he wanted the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), also known as MI6, would assist in publicizing his notes. Photo: Churchill Archives Centre / NTB scanpix

Ten years later wrote Dagbladet that spy book was allegedly stopped by peaks in labor. The newspaper claimed that the book referred Norwegian name showing that Treholt was not the only KGB spy. It was about some of the Foreign Ministry and the Labour Party who were still inside. One name was also in the East German Stasi archives.

– Heard never about any book

The allegations that it should have been used heavy diplomacy to halt the book, was categorically rejected by Thorbjorn Jagland, who at the time was both leader of the Labour Party and the Norwegian Foreign Minister.

– I can safely say that Labor’s leadership never heard about any book, and therefore had no occasion to be shocked, as alleged in Dagbladet. We never made any attempt to stop any book.

Mitrokhin categories KGB connections:

Refined KGB: People who were cultivated by the KGB were picked as potential candidates to perform special assignments for Russia. For the KGB, it was important to have a complete overview of persons as service could benefit from. In most cases where the KGB had contact with Norwegians was the purpose of contact to assess whether the person could come in handy. A number of Norwegians were cultivated by the KGB. Ie that in the early days was “cultivated” or “processed”, so they either became convinced that working for Russia was the right thing, or that they actually meant it.

KGB terminal: A KGB contact has gained a certain relationship of trust with the KGB, a relationship that could be exploited by KGB. A KGB jack which delivers information in a confidential manner, or performing other missions, will normally understand that his cooperation with the intelligence officer is something more than a normal contact. A KGB contact will rarely ask KGB about other re-benefits other than the moral and possible political support.

Confidential contact: a confidential contact is a person with full understanding of their own actions on a confidential way of delivering secret information to an intelligence officer, or performing other confidential mission at the request of an intelligence officer. Intelligence officer has not told the confidential contact that he is an officer attached to the KGB, but the confidential contact should in many cases still be able to understand this context. Confidential contacts developed on the basis of personal friendship, common interests or perceptions, and the like. The confidential contact has not signed any written commitments.

KGB agent: A KGB agent has entered into an express agreement, which may well be in writing, with his guidance officer. The agent carries out assignments of various kinds; often with ideological and / or economic motive.

As foreign minister, he became aware that two people in UD was mentioned in the Mitrokhin Archive, but these were checked out of the case, he explained.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on its side in a press release that” three persons who at the time worked in the foreign service was discussed in the historical material. “

The questions arises is more: Who was right? How many MFA staff and other Norwegian citizens was that all about? Is not this information public both have an interest, and not least, entitled to?

Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made it clear that they do not intend to help throw light on the matter. Together with the Ministry of Justice refused UD in February 2013 a request for access to information and documents related to the Mitrokhin Archive, and referred to the Security Act. “Protection needs are considered to be 30 years,” stated in the refusal.

Treholt and Haavik mentioned in the manuscript plans

TV 2, however, visited archives in Cambridge where Mitrokhin released notes stored, and on the basis of own findings sought Police Security Service (PST) on file access.

SPIONBOKMANUSET: The jacket of a snippet from Mitrokhin and Andrew spionbok, sent by MI6 to POT in July 1998. The documents from British intelligence has been classified top secret, but was declassified last year. Photo: GORAN JORGANOVICH / TV 2

In the extensive material is declassified by PST and SIS, it emerges that Christopher Andrews spionbokprosjekt was known POT already in 1997. Mitrokhin SIS codename to POT was “Twill”. The following year was also players in the publishing industry initiated the project, and in April 1998 received Monitoring Central (OVS) the first text drafts that concerned Norway.

According to a note from the British SIS 6. November 1998 signed Arne Treholt and Gunvor Galtung Haavik scripted plans:

“There is great interest Among Nordic publishers in publishing the TWILL book on the basis of the synopsis. However, They would want Reviews their versions of the book two include more material of specific interest two Reviews their audience. Professor Andrew Intend two include Treholt, as well as the Gunvor Haavik case. We hope That you have no objection to the use of These cases. “

declassified: Front of Mitrokhin report which was handed Stoltenberg The government in January 2001. Photo: GORAN JORGANOVICH / TV 2

Warned about spy threat

In the declassified material, there is also a report that was sent to the Ministry of Justice in January 2001. The report outlines significant additional UD employees than it has previously been lit. public, and warns furthermore that the threat against UD “remains as real.”

POT report that reveals the identities of 16 Norwegians, recommends actions against the Foreign Ministry, who then chaired by Jagland:

“Of the 16 persons who have been identified and discussed below, there are 10 that have been or are still employed at the Foreign Ministry. Accordingly, it is imperative that POT on the basis of information from the Mitrokhin Archive orients UD that this threat remains as real and that the orientation is given in such a way that the Ministry’s management handedly or in cooperation with POT makes sure to bring this knowledge further to all of its employees. “

As the Ministry of Justice and Foreign Affairs have denied TV2′s access requests, it is unknown how the ministries treated this threat to UD. In the Ministry’s press release from 2011 mentioned the report, but not warnings of POT and the number of UD employees were discussed.

In a written response, the Foreign Ministry’s communications unit declined to comment on the information in the declassified PST documents:

WARNED: Police Intelligence Service believed that conditions were uncovered showed that” the threat remains as real “against UD. Photo: GORAN JORGANOVICH / TV 2

– Information from the Mitrokhin archive includes allegations of irregular contact with KGB. These conditions are the prosecutors who have been responsible for evaluating. We therefore refer to PST which facilitate technical authority. It is not natural that the Foreign Ministry comment further, writes Assistant Director Kristin Enstad in the email.

These Norwegians were identified by POT:

• “Uli” confidential contact: Monitoring Central (OVS) knew before that “Uli” had contact with two Russian intelligence officers in the years 1970-1971. Was on the list of names OVS checked against the Stasi records in 1996; a case that caused major political unrest that year. Prosecutions ordered halt to investigations, and the case against the “Uli” was later dropped.
• Jotun director, confidential contact: In Singapore in 1972-1975 . Ga reportedly information to the KGB about the port of Singapore, about planned repairs on US naval vessels in the area, as well as on matters which concerned the People’s Republic of China. He should also have handed over to their guidance officer trying to paint like the American navy spent on their vessels.
• KGB agent “Majb”: NATO employed at Kolsås. Recruited in 1967, handed over allegedly classified information and ceased to cooperate with the KGB in 1982. Was investigated by OVS in case “Beta”. One of the intelligence officers he had contact with was declared persona non grata in 1973.
• KGB agent “Khomjakov”: Embassy Employee in Moscow. Mitrokhin notes contain detailed information about how the KGB watched or persuaded “Khomjakov” to work for the KGB, who got access to the restricted area at the embassy so that classified material was compromised. Was convicted by a Norwegian court for espionage.
• Gunvor Galtung Haavik: Mitrokhin notes provide numerous and detailed information about how the KGB recruited Powys. The oldest information dates back to World War II. The information was however known from before for OVS, as a result of additional questioning after she was arrested and charged with espionage. Powys died in custody before the case against her came up in court.
• KGB agent “Viking”: Diplomat and an employee of the Foreign Ministry. Allegedly given KGB information about NATO. One of four officers, after Justice Department’s approval in July 2001 were interviewed, since they were on active duty.
• Document Management “Oskar”: Diplomat the Norwegian Foreign Ministry from 1945 and served in a number of countries. KGB practiced pressure on him because he was gay. “Oskar” has even admitted conditions in writing and handed over documents under great pressure and after much hesitation and reluctance.
• KGB agent “Makdonald”: The captain of the Norwegian ship in the Norwegian merchant fleet, agent for the KGB in Arkhangelsk in 1968.
• Mann, born in 1939: Apparently cultivated by the KGB agent in Leningrad in 1965 -1967 while he was a student.
• Embassy Employee in Moscow: has been initiated love affair with Russian woman who, according to Mitrokhin was employed by the KGB for cultivating young Norwegian men with access to information. It entered allegedly in the KGB’s plans that the relationship would tie up considerable resources in the Norwegian security services.
• Embassy Employee in Moscow: KGB considered him to be hostile tuned to the USSR, and he was later put out of action: “There is much to suggest that XX was unjustly dismissed from his position and that of Foreign Affairs in this connection was subject to gross manipulation of the KGB’s side.”
• “Bartov,” embassy employee: According to Mitrokhin cultivated in 1980, reported however uninvited from the OVS about their contacts with KGB officers.
• “Perov,” embassy employee: The diplomat who has served a number of places in the world was according to Mitrokhin cultivated by the KGB.
• The employee at the Prime Minister’s Office: KGB officer who cultivated Labor man described by POT as “very active.”
• “Frog”: Employed by Moss Rosenberg. KGB established contact in 1975, and one of the contacts was declared persona non grata in Norway in January 1977 because of “Khomjakov» -saken. “Frog” declined meetings in 1980.
• “Brzhevnova” chifferansatt in UD: A woman who was cultured in Prague, according to Mitrokhin handed over the key the embassy chifferrom the Czechoslovak Security Service (StB).

Secret talks

PST documents lift slightly the veil on how the Justice Department handled Mitrokhin report. It was submitted in January 2001.

– A aims to orientate Public Prosecutions and the Secretary before talks with stakeholders conducted, wrote surveillance chief Per Sefland in the note that accompanied the report.

Six months later, the Ministry agrees that POT followed up those who were mentioned in the Mitrokhin documents, in the interest of “individuals and that the information from the KGB archives could be known form of a book release “:

” The Department joins Monitoring Centre’s assessments in the report, including recommendations for concrete follow-up of the relevant persons. The Ministry assumes that POT implement follow-up as soon as possible. “

I secretly conducted POT talks with four officers who were still in active service, three of them in UD.

POT assessed to establish so-called preventive issues on those that were featured in the KGB archives, and “came under some doubt» forward to do the. The cases were legally obsolete, but in some of the cases had POT newer information that made the assessment needed, says the report.

The British informed the 35 Norwegians

The 16 that the Justice Department learned about, was far from the only Norwegians featured in Mitrokhin archive.

A POT overview February 2000 reveals that British intelligence through 90s sent information about 35 persons they assumed were Norwegians:

“It can not be seen that it is undertaken any investigation into these matters. It is not applied to what were considered at OVS, but since they have been filed in the archive has probably been the assessment that it is unacceptable to do nothing in the current situation. Latest information dating to 1984 and is thus legally obsolete. This report concerns all Norwegian citizens mentioned. “

In the report the Ministry of Justice received the following year, it was not estimated how many Norwegians who was featured in the Mitrokhin Archive, nor mentioned that under half were identified on the basis of SIS information:

– In Mitrokhin rich archive occur a number of Norwegian names and references to Norwegian conditions. Monitoring panel has in the period 1994-1999 received this information from the SIS. It is reportedly the Norwegians who have been in the KGB’s attention in time 1943-1984 (…) In Mitrokhin documents it is also mentioned several other conditions where the persons referred to may be Norwegians, but where it has not been possible to identify the person, the report POT delivered to the Stoltenberg government.

Norwegians KGB ARCHIVE: British MI6 informed through 90s Police Monitoring Service (POT) about 35 people you counted were Norwegians discussed by KGB archivist Vasily Mitrokhin. In January 2001, warned POT Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the spy threat against UD “remains as real.” Graphics: Kjell Persen / TV 2

This is Mitrokhin archive:

After Churchill College Archive in Cambridge in July 2014 opened the Mitrokhin Archive, published Dagbladet as the first Norwegian newspaper parts of the former secret archive which is the world’s only known list of the KGB’s clandestine operations during the Cold War .

In this material discussed two of Einar Gerhardsen ministers as KGB agents. KGB blackmailed also a UD-top because he was homosexual in the 1950s. These three individuals were careful in monitoring the service’s attention.

When Vasily Mitrokhin defected to Britain in 1992, he took with him the secrets he had smuggled out of KGB headquarters in Moscow.

The retired sjefsarkivaren had from 1972 to 1984 access to 300,000 folders. In the beginning there were notes tucked into shoes, and eventually became the documents and papers in his jacket pocket, with the constant risk of their own lives.

He buried all documents at his country retreat outside Moscow. And when MI6 in a secret operation extracted Mitrokhin and his wife, they also had to dig up six large boxes of documents that they took with them out of Russia.

Mitrokhin archive has been a gold mine for intelligence services in many countries, and for historians has thrown considerable light on the Cold War.

– Russians attributed activity throughout Scandinavia enormous strategic importance, said Mitrokhin in an interview with Berlingske Tidende in 1999.