This notwithstanding, I should probably say that Rinnan not entirely accurate in his statement. It attaches not a corporate director to talk down their own company, but one could perhaps expect that a person at this level in a large company had tabs on the concepts and data and a greater level of precision. We can take it point by point:
1 challenges with the electricity prices affect the possibility of return to the owner municipalities. Rinnan writes in its response: “‘. Although not so that it threatens the annual payout of approx. 300 million to our shareholders in the coming years. ” The 300 million divided into 200 million in dividends and 105 million in interest on subordinated loans. However, we can read a more reserved rating in the note to the owner municipalities from autumn 2013, “Falling the price level down to 20 cents / kWh and remains at this level, it is hardly acceptable to the Board and maintain a dividend level of approx. NOK 200 million. ” Such price level is probably realistic, therefore alerts Eidsiva need for changes in the shareholder agreement and yield will be reduced.
2 Eidsiva book equity has decreased from $ 7.467 million per. 31.12.10 NOK 5.095 million per. 31.12.13. This is significant exercise was done in 2010, when 1.5 billion of equity was converted into subordinated debt and $ 750 million of equity capital was paid back to the owners. By ownership municipalities came Hamar particularly well, they had a lot of investment in time, with a payment of 167 million. In addition, this resulted in a tax savings of about 60 million annually. It dripped a little on all own communities, so this was all for, but now in the wake of low electricity prices, one can ask the question of how wise this outline was.
3 Rinnan states that inland municipalities and counties own one of the country’s more solid companies. It is clear that there is value in the company – power plants, power lines, incinerators, electric direksjonsbil, holiday in Hafjell etc. But all companies need while ample liquidity. My simple point in the first post was that of NOK 230 million in the bank at year end, so calling warning bells. The obligations of payments for 2014 is as far as I can see: Dividends to shareholders of $ 200 million tax of $ 350 million, repayment of debt of $ 350 million Combined, this £ 900 million. You obviously need to borrow.
4 I should also point out some other obvious errors in Rinnans accordingly. He writes that the net value is 9500000000. How can that be right with its own information about the asset value is level approx. £ 6 billion. Furthermore, he states, debt to U.S. $ 5 billion. Preliminary results for 2013 provide a debt of 10.9 billion. Thus also claim that Eidsiva have more equity than debt failures, it is approx. 32 percent.
There is urgent need for a more critical attitude to the development of Eidsiva. Do Municipalities must take a more proactive role through business meeting. One of the summaries of those investigated Troms Kraft, was that business meeting where slept, everything was settled in her room, the organ was hardly a sandpåstrøer. In order not to end up in the same situation, must be required to give an account of the public in an academically stronger than the Rinnan performing here. It is not wrong to discuss the group’s weaknesses openly, it is a weakness not to do it. We – the citizens and the electricity customers – must on the one hand be confident that the administration of the group not mislead owners into thinking Eidsiva will continue to provide major contributions to municipal operating budget. On the other hand, do not ambitious mayors suggest new antics with equity. Eidsiva will primarily produce and deliver electricity to a proper price for the customers and the company’s need for investment and maintenance.
Finn Olav Rolijordet, member of the council Red Gurgaon
No comments:
Post a Comment